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ABSTRACT

Can enterprise zones have any long-term effects on the economic
status of minority populations or on the concentration of poverty in urban
neighborhoods? This question was tackled from two perspectives. First, do
enterprise zone interventions make sense in the context of existing models of
racial inequality and ghetto development. Second, do the existing literature
and evaluation studies provide evidence that enterprise zones are benefiting
the urban poor in general and poor minorities in particular?
This study examines five selected official evaluations of state enterprise
zone programs looking at how incentives are targeted toward specific
populations and places and whether benefits to targeted communities were
measured. The goals of state enterprise zone programs definitely include
economic advancement for the disadvantaged and reducing poverty, but
these goals are not directly reflected by the structure of enterprise zone
programs or program evaluations. Existing measures of benefits to targeted
populations or areas, generally yield negative results.
The principal finding from this review of enterprise zone evaluations
is the weak link between the structure of the programs, what they intend to
accomplish, and what accomplishments evaluators measure. Existing
evaluation research on enterprise zones does not provide evidence that
existing enterprise zone programs are decreasing racial income disparity or
improving the conditions of the urban poor. Enterprise zones are the wrong
tool to fix the lack of economic opportunity in blighted urban neighborhoods
because there is a poor fit between the structure of enterprise zones and the
goal of providing opportunities for economic advancement to the urban
poor.
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION

The phenomena of concentrated urban poverty in the U.S. has a
complex relationship with race. Urban minority populations have suffered
disproportionately from de-industrialization and economic instability
(Wilson 1987). Yet, the most talked about urban economic development
program designed to create opportunity in poverty areas does not explicitly
addresses questions of race or even disadvantage Qones 1987, Harris 1992,
Glover 1993). Many advocates of enterprise zones hope they will help
alleviate racial economic disparity that leaves concentrations of poor
minority populations in depressed urban areas. This research project looks at
how urban enterprise zones address the issue of racial inequity through their
goals, program structure, and measured outcomes.
Variations on the enterprise zone theme have been the centerpiece of
the White House urban agenda under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton
(Bendick and Rasmussen 1986, Boyle 1995, Fulton and Newman 1994, Mier
and Pelzer 1982). Thirty-eight states have their own enterprise zone programs
(Rubin and College 1994; Wong 1996). Yet despite this popularity, nobody has
demonstrated the connection between enterprise zones and the problems of
concentrated urban poverty and inequality that they seek to address. Poor
inner-city neighborhoods have high concentrations of minorities, enterprise
zones target these "depressed" sections of inner cities, but enterprise zone
programs make few explicit claims about who receives the benefits. Given
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the presence of pronounced racial inequality, the unanswered question is
how enterprise zones address race. To be consistent with the goals of
community and economic advancement, enterprise zones should provide
tangible benefits for minority members of the community. Proponents of
enterprise zones claim they will provide new economic opportunities in an
expanding economic pie (Green 1990). But the rhetoric of zones is not simply
about growth, it is targeted growth that will touch the most distressed
communities. In contrast, most reports of the benefits of enterprise zones
give figures of jobs created, dollars invested, and numbers of new business
starts without reference to the distribution of those benefits. The simple fact
that businesses and jobs locate within designated enterprise zones does not
necessarily translate into increased opportunities for racial minority residents
of the community. A full understanding of the benefits of urban enterprise
zones must take a critical approach and ask who receives those benefits.

Purpose and Significance
This project looks at how state urban enterprise zone programs and
evaluations studies address race. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) is about to commission an evaluation of the federal
enterprise zone program, and many states have yet to complete program
evaluations. This research could contribute to improving program
evaluation designs and to a better understanding of the merits of enterprise
zone programs. A better conceptual understanding of enterprise zones
combined with more sensitive evaluation criteria will increase the likelihood
that these programs contribute to increased economic opportunity for
minority residents of inner cities and to urban revitalization in general. Most
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importantly, if there is no evidence to suggest that enterprise zones can
contribute to economic opportunity in urban poverty areas, then it is time to
reconsider the whole concept.

Organization of the Study
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 review relevant literature on enterprise zones,
economic theories of poverty areas, and research on the benefits of enterprise
zones for minority populations.I I outline several causes of racially
segregated urban poverty areas and discuss the ways enterprise zones may
address those underlying causes.
Chapter 5 involves close textual analysis of five state enterprise zone
evaluation studies focusing on program goals, targeting mechanisms, and
incentives. I selected Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin for
their geographic diversity, program variety, inclusion of urban enterprise
zones, and availability of an official evaluation study report. While these
states and reports are diverse, they may not be entirely representative of all
zone programs and evaluations. This study identifies the extent to which
benefits to minority populations are anticipated and measured through
written program goals, incentives, and evaluations. I examine stated goals
and program explanations for references to (1) race, (2) disadvantage (as an
attribute of people), and (3) distress (as an attribute of a place). This study
identifies programmatic links to the objective of increasing economic
opportunity for inner-city minorities present in (1) zone selection criteria, (2)
1The scant existing literature deals primarily with blacks to the exclusion of other minority
groups. While the evidence discussed in this paper is primarily looking at black-white income
disparity, many of the ideas apply to other racial/ ethnic groups that are affected by
concentrated urban poverty and income inequality. I suggest that future evaluation research on
enterprise zones be cast more broadly to look at the program's effects on inner-city minority
residents including Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans.
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requirements to qualify for incentives, and (3) the types of incentives offered.
Finally, I examine the indicators used in program evaluation studies to
determine if they reveal any information about program participation by
minority members of the population or benefits to them. The concluding
chapter sums up the relationships between the idea of revitalizing poverty
areas and enterprise zone goals, programs, and achievements.
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CHAPTER2

THE ENTERPRISE ZONE CONCEPT

Government Policy and Targeted Redevelopment
"There has been a long-standing national interest in distributing the
nation's economic growth in a manner that reduced the number of places and
groups that are left outside the economic mainstream" (Hanson 1983: 61).
Policies promoting westward expansion, port development, grants to canal
and railroad companies, regulation of interstate transportation rates, and the
national highway system served to connect the national economy and
disperse economic growth. The Full Employment Act, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the Area Redevelopment Act, the Appalachian Regional
Commission, the antipoverty program, and the Model Cities program worked
towards achieving inter-group and inter-regional equity through economic
opportunity.
Enterprise zones are only the most recent example in a long history of
targeted economic development programs. Federal programs focusing on
minority opportunity were developed in response to the urban riots in the
sixties. The Urban Employment Opportunities Development Act of 1967 was
a federal program to subsidize the location of corporate branch plants in poor
urban areas. Community development corporations were created by part of
the Special Impact Program of the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity
(Harrison 1974). Until the late seventies, loans were the chief component of
minority business assistance. During the 1980s targeted procurement
5

programs became the backbone of minority business programs, with total
dollar amounts increasing substantially.
Despite a notable federal commitment to lessening inequality, other
federal programs including home finance, public housing, and highway
construction, have contributed to the spatial concentration of poverty. Since
World War II, policies favoring decentralized suburban growth assisted the
exodus of upper and middle-income households from central cities, leaving
many urban neighborhoods disproportionately poor and disproportionately
minority (Florida and Feldman 1988). Despite the relatively open borders,
segregation persists. As workers and consumers moved out of the city, so did
many shops, services, and jobs. Many urban areas have experienced longterm decline or stagnation in economic activity. Ironically, civil rights
legislation helped undermine black-owned businesses in black communities
by opening up new markets and allowing residents to purchase goods and
services outside the area Qones 1987). Increased residential choice for blacks
led to selective out-migration which has left ghettos very poor albeit still
disproportionately minority (Bates 1995).

The Origin and Adaptation of Enterprise Zones
The origin of enterprise zones is usually traced back to British Labour
Party activist, Peter Hall, who proposed "freeports" in 1977 as a last-ditch
effort to revitalize severely blighted areas.

Hall hoped to allow private

business to re-create the success of Hong Kong's economic transformation
within the most severely blighted and abandoned areas of Liverpool and
Glasgow (Hall 1982). These enterprise zones would have import duty and tax
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exemption, no barriers to international trade or investment, deregulation,
and a drastic reduction of social services.
The Heritage Foundation brought the enterprise zone idea across the
Atlantic in 1979 with a pamphlet calling for deregulation, free trade, and the
elimination of the minimum wage in order to allow small start-up
companies to thrive and create wealth (Green 1990). By lowering costs,
enterprise zones would help the creation of new firms. Like Hall's
"freeports," the Heritage Foundation invoked enterprise zones as an
approach to encourage economic reuse of depressed urban areas by making
private investment more profitable through tax and regulatory relief (Green
1990, Hall 1981, Hall 1982).
On U.S. soil, enterprise zones quickly evolved away from the
international free trade zone concept toward a focus on fostering new
entrepreneurial activity. As enterprise zones became more widely discussed
in the U.S., the discourse began to include benefits for the urban poor who
would participate in the economic revitalization. American adaptations of
enterprise zones focus specifically on creating new private-sector jobs instead
of focusing broadly on the economic prosperity of the firm. A goal of many
enterprise zones is to increase economic opportunities for residents within
the zone. Strong supporters of enterprise zones, like Representative Jack
Kemp, predicted deregulation and tax breaks for distressed areas would be a
way to create indigenous economic growth with minimal losses in public
revenue. Kemp saw enterprise zones as "a way to uncork the entrepreneurial
spirit that lies dormant in every downtrodden urban neighborhood"
(Guskind 1990). Proponents claimed the zones would create new businesses
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and new jobs without diverting people and economic activity from elsewhere
(Green 1990).
Support and funding for federal enterprise zones finally coalesced in
the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots (Gunn 1993, Boyle 1995). Civil unrest
created a strong national mandate to take action and became the touchstone
in many urban policy debates. The connection drawn between urban riots in
Los Angeles and Miami and enterprise zones reinforced the expectation that
enterprise zones would ease the strain in poor, predominately black and
Hispanic neighborhoods.

Components of Enterprise Zone Programs
It is difficult to make categorical statements about all enterprise zones

since state, local, and federal programs are diverse and they have changed
significantly in the last fifteen years. The original enterprise zone proposals
in the U.S. were "federal, supply-side, anti-regulatory, conservative
Republican" programs designed to "attract new, small businesses to the inner
city," while by the time enterprise zones were implemented they were "state
or local, private-public, reregulatory partnerships" with the additional goal of
retaining existing businesses in urban, rural, and suburban areas (Wolf 1990).
The common elements that define enterprise zones are tax and regulatory
changes targeted to an economically distressed geographical area. As
legislatures wrestled with program details, enterprise zones became an
collection of favorite pieces of past programs melded with supply-side
incentives.
Enterprise zone eligibility criteria descend directly from Urban
Development Action Grants (UDAG) program criteria (DED 1987, Green

8

1990). States adopted these criteria trying to second-guess federal officials
even before a federal enterprise program materialized (Green 1990). State and
federal criteria include measures of both physical blight and residents'
economic well-being: high unemployment, persistent poverty, low
household income, declining population, UDAG eligibility,s high proportion
of population on public assistance, the minority composition of the
population, housing vacancies, and physical deterioration (DED 1987, Glover
1993).
The Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Bill sponsored by Kemp and
Garcia in 1980, included such provisions as cuts in social security, capital gains
taxes cuts, and rapid depreciation allowances. The 1981 version eliminated
capital gains taxes and provided additional tax credits. Other measures
included privatizing some public services, cutting other services, prohibiting
rent control, minimizing regulations, and weakening labor unions
(Goldsmith 1982).
At the other end of the spectrum, President Clinton's Enterprise
Communities and Empowerment Zones Act is not structured as a simple
supply-side incentive package; it is a more comprehensive reinvestment
package targeted at designated depressed areas. It integrates the supply-side
enterprise zone approach with a community planning and empowerment
approach descended from Model Cities (Rubin and College 1994). This
expanded scope draws on the lesson from early enterprise zones that tax

su.s. Code 42-69-5318.

UDAG eligibility and selection criteria include the existence of areas of
concentrated poverty within the city in contiguous census tracts housing 10% of the population
in which at least 70 percent of the residents have incomes below 80 percent of the median
income of the city and at least 30 percent of residents have incomes below the national poverty
level. Other criteria used to score applications include demonstrated results in providing low
and moderate income housing, age of housing, extent of population lag, growth of per capita
income, unemployment, and surplus labor.
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breaks and regulatory relief are weak policies when not combined with other
programs. The act includes wage credits for hiring zone residents and direct
benefits like day care, drug-use prevention, crime control, and job training
(Szabo and DeMott 1993).
Enterprise zone programs at the state and local level have expanded
from preferential tax treatment and more flexible application of regulations to
encompass labor-related incentives, special government services,
infrastructure investments, and preferential access to government grants
(Gunn 1993, Rubin and College 1994). The most common labor-related
incentive is tax credits for hiring disadvantaged persons. Twenty-nine out of
thirty-seven states with enterprise zone legislation have tax incentives for
selective hiring (Rubin and College 1994). Examples of special government
services and infrastructure include crime control, public child care, job
training, community development programs, low interest loans, zone
marketing, supplementary social services, landscaping, and road
improvements. Most state and local enterprise zone initiatives still include
some combination of property tax abatements, tax credits for hiring new
employees, sales tax reductions, and deductions for capital improvements
(Guskind 1990 and Jones 1987).

Summary
Like most economic development strategies, the early enterprise zone
idea presumed a simple model that ignores many complexities of economic
and social reality. Increasing investment and employment cannot solve
every facet of the urban crisis (Munt 1991). An assortment of neo-liberal
programs have been incorporated into enterprise zones to remedy
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community needs unaddressed by supply-side incentives. However, while
enterprise zones are touted as an antidote to urban blight, the discourse about
enterprise zones largely ignores factors like racial inequality, segregation, and
discrimination.
Enterprise zones are not all derived from a single economic theory of
the causes of urban distress and the diversity of programs reflects this lack of
unified theoretical foundation. What enterprise zones have in common is
the goal of increasing local economic prosperity and employment through
geographically targeted incentives. A targeted economic development
program like enterprise zones is consistent with long-held public policy goals
of extending economic opportunity to all places and groups. The following
chapters explore the question of whether enterprise zones further these goals
in theory or in practice.
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CHAPTER3
INNER CITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RACE

Enterprise Zones and Racial Inequality
To understand how enterprise zones work we need to ask what causes
the concentration of poverty in ghetto areas and how enterprise zones
interact with those forces. This chapter is divided into three sections. The
first section highlights evidence that race is a significant variable in urban
poverty both in terms of individual earnings and ghetto residence1. The
second section outlines the major models of economic inequality and urban
poverty areas. The final section identifies the broad categories of economic
development strategies for combating inequality and urban poverty and
draws the connections between those strategies and the models that underlie
them. The close of the chapter explains how enterprise zones fit into the
overall framework of models and strategies.
The theory of enterprise zones is only racially neutral on the surface
because it does not address issues of racism, access, and participation.
Strategies that ignore issues of race are not truly race-neutral in practice
because of preexisting inequalities and barriers to success (Goldsmith and
Blakely 1992). Because of the inequality of economic fortunes associated with
race we cannot assume that enterprise zones will benefit minorities equally
with whites simply because urban enterprise zones target distressed
1"Ghetto" is a frequently used term without a fixed operational definition. Although race and
poverty are correlated, ghettos are most frequently defined by the latter. Lynn (1990) and
Jargowsky (1994) define ghetto as central city census tracts with overall poverty rates of 40
percent or more.
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neighborhoods. Almost all enterprise zone programs ignore minority
populations' special circumstances. Enterprise zone programs do not
explicitly emphasize minority employment or ownership (Glover 1993, Jones
1987, Munt 1991). This leads to the questions of whether enterprise zones are
well adapted to the needs of inner-city minority populations and whether
enterprise zones can have any long-term effects on the socioeconomic status
of minority populations.

Existing Racial Inequality and Concentrated Urban Poverty
Their are many dimensions to urban poverty, but from most angles
race and ethnicity remain important characteristics. Race matters in
unemployment rates, skill levels, occupation, wages, and geography.

Poverty

is becoming increasingly concentrated and racial inequity is growing.
Over the last several decades poverty has become increasingly
concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods. As ghettos expand, the incidence
of ghetto poverty continues to vary sharply by race. In 1980, 2 percent of all
U.S. non-Hispanic white poor people, 21 percent of all U.S. black poor people,
and 16 percent of all U.S. Hispanic poor people lived in ghettos. During the
eighties "ghetto poverty among blacks increased both in terms of the number
of blacks living in ghettos and as a percentage of the black population"
Oargowsky 1994: 288). Almost two-thirds of the ghetto poor are black, and
most of the rest are Hispanic (Lynn 1990). Poverty is increasing most rapidly
among African-American and American Hispanics (Mueller 1990).
Only a small percentage of the poor remain poor for significant parts of
their lives, but blacks are disproportionately represented among the
persistently poor. Between 1974 and 1983, 5 percent of the population was
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below the poverty line for at least 80% of that period. African Americans
made up 66% of this group in long-term poverty (Mueller 1990).
High unemployment and low skill levels are defining characteristics of
the ghetto (Bates 1995). Unemployment rates vary significantly by race both
within and outside the ghetto, with black unemployment rates remaining
roughly twice as high as those of the national economy. Unskilled inner-city
workers are much less mobile occupationally and geographically than the
population as a whole (Hall 1982).
Blacks are disproportionately represented among employees in
declining industries (Wilson 1987). A national study of the effects of deindustrialization found that industries most affected by plant closings had
relatively high levels of black workers. Industries that suffered most from
foreign competition from 1964 to 1975 had an average minority work force of
11.5 percent compared to 7.4 percent in growth industries. Blacks have also
been less well positioned to benefit from new employment in growth
industries because the black population is disproportionately concentrated in
slow-growth metropolitan areas (Bartik 1993).
Among employed workers, racial economic disparities are evident.
Maume (1996) found that the wage gap between white and black workers has
widened from $2.48 per hour in 1976 to $2.66 in 1985 in constant dollars.
After controlling for education, training, and experience Maume estimates
that 26% of the wage gap in 1985 was racial discrimination, up from 16% in
1976. Harrison and Gorham (1992) reached similar conclusions about the
deterioration of black earning power relative to whites at all levels of
educational achievement.
Minorities are extremely underrepresented in managerial employment
and entrepreneurship even within ghetto areas (Glover 1993, Goldsmith and
14

Blakely 1992). The majority of ghetto firms are owned by white people living
outside the ghetto (Bates 1993). Black-owned businesses employ fewer people
and make smaller profits than white-owned firms within the ghetto.

Economic Theories of Poverty Areas
Poli ti cal and academic interest in ghetto economic development
swelled in the wake of urban riots in the sixties. Policy specialists began to
recognize the importance of economic opportunity within poor minority
neighborhoods in addition to the more traditional goal of racial integration
(Harrison 1974). Promoting economic opportunity became part of the
discussion on promoting social stability (Hanson 1983).
The relationship between race and income has been carefully
documented in inner-city neighborhoods. Researchers looked for
explanations for the growing poverty of inner-city neighborhoods and for the
persistent inequity along racial lines. Racial economic inequality is
undeniably an enduring characteristic of the economic structure of the United
States, although academicians and politicians disagree about the forces that
perpetuate inequality. The following is a summary of the basic explanations
for the economics of poor inner-city minority neighborhoods.

Neo-Classical Economic Theory
There are two conventional approaches to racial discrimination and
economic disparities along racial lines: utility theory and human capital
theory. The utility theory approach stems from work done in the 1950s by
Gary S. Becker (1971). Those who discriminate find non-monetary
satisfaction in not employing or working with minority workers.
"Individuals are assumed to act as if they have 'tastes for discrimination,' and
15

these tastes are the most important immediate cause of actual
discrimination," (Becker 1971: 122). Becker used census data from 1890-1940
and a straight forward neoclassical free market model to calculate the
"discrimination coefficient'' which facilitated empirical comparisons of
discrimination between places, occupations, and through time.
The human capital approach looks to education, skills, and health to
explain productivity differences reflected in wage differences. Minorities are
less productive and consequently lower paid because of differences in the
education they have been able to attain. The "flawed character" model is a
version of the human capital approach that focuses on behavioral
inadequacies of the poor often associated with attitudes or culture. The
culture of poverty and racial inferiority theories are the two most common
examples of the flawed-character perspective (Schiller 1988). The human
capital model denies the role of discrimination and instead attributes
inequality to impersonal economic forces (Fusfeld and Bates 1984).
Several advocates of the human capital explanation argue that intergroup inequality in the post civil rights era does not result from
discrimination. Shulman and Darity (1989) call this the declining
discrimination hypothesis. Studies supporting the declining discrimination
hypothesis compare employed blacks and whites of the same age, education,
or other characteristics to show declining earnings differences. The
theoretical arguments accompanying this sort of analysis assert that efficient
labor markets work impartially with regard to race. The implication is that
the persistence of inequality results from cultural and human capital
deficiencies in the minority population. Shulman and Darity present
convincing arguments that the declining discrimination hypothesis is
inconsistent with economic data if labor force participation and
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underemployment are considered. Examination of labor market experiences
during the eighties revealed increasing real wage differences between blacks
and whites (Maume 1996).
Utility and human capital approaches explain the persistent poverty of
predominately minority ghetto areas without reference to market failure or
structural processes that create inequality. The market will work to increase
racial equality because discrimination is inefficient. Both neoclassical
approaches to racial differences in income suggest that the solution requires
changing people, either through changing the attitudes of those who
discriminate or through increasing the human capital of poor individuals as
a way of increasing productivity.

Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis
Kain (1968) argued that a "spatial mismatch" between new suburban
employment locations and exclusionary housing practices reduced job
opportunities for blacks living in the inner city. Kain explained that
employers located in the suburbs were reluctant to risk offending white
residents by bringing black workers into the area, resulting in little demand
for black workers. This resembles Becker's argument except the white
suburban consumers, rather than the employers, discriminate. On the supply
side, distance from suburban jobs meant blacks were less likely to hear about
job opportunities and would have to spend more time and money to
commute when they did find employment. New jobs may be so poorly paid
that they do not justify relocating, or they may be in areas without affordable
housing options. More recent supporters of the mismatch hypothesis include
Leonard (1987), Wilson (1987), Kasarda (1989), and Holzer and Ihlanfeldt
(1996).
17

Empirical support for the spatial mismatch hypothesis comes from
studies on residential segregation and journeys to work. In a study of
residential and employment patterns in Chicago and Los Angeles, Leonard
(1987: 323) concludes that "residential segregation strongly influences black
employment patterns and limits the efficacy of efforts to integrate the
workplace."
The magnitude of race-specific earnings differentials resulting from the
spatial mismatch has grown over time (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 1996). Holzer
and Ihlanfeldt have found through their research on 3000 employers in four
metropolitan areas that employers located closer to black residences and
public transportation are more likely to hire black employees, and that black
earnings increase with the distance of their employer from black population
centers. Their research also validates the strong effect of the skill mismatch
which suggests that human capital investment is a policy response of equal
importance to residential desegregation and transportation.
Bartik' s work (1993) on economic development and black economic
success supports the spatial mismatch hypothesis with a new twist. Bartik
found that black earnings are highly responsive to demand in the
metropolitan labor market, but that blacks tend to live in slow growth
metropolitan areas. Residential location of blacks is an important
determinate of earnings both within and between metropolitan areas. The
implication of much of the work relating to the spatial mismatch hypothesis
is that local labor market conditions have strong effects on the earnings of
black central city residents. Increases in the demand for labor have positive
effects on black household earnings despite confounding factors emphasized
by the human capital model.
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While Kain focused on employment discrimination as the
predominate demand side factor preventing labor from finding employment,
more recent advocates of the spatial mismatch hypothesis have shifted
attention to job skill requirements as the predominate demand-side factor
aggravating the effects of residential segregation. The spatial restructuring of
metropolitan America has resulted in a skill mismatch as well as a spatial
mismatch between residential patterns and employment (Galster and Keeney
1988). The numbers of blue-collar jobs in central cities have declined since
the sixties, partly due to a shift of production away from the central city and
partly due to increased efficiency and expanded foreign production. A
significant number of jobs remain in central business districts, but many
require specific sets of qualifications and skills which make them less
accessible to poor inner city residents.
The research on the decline of entry-level jobs in the inner city
provides more direct evidence that these demographic and
employment trends have produced a serious mismatch between
the skills of inner-city blacks and the opportunities available to
them. Substantial job losses have occurred in the very
industries in which urban minorities have the greatest access,
and substantial employment gains have occurred in the highereducation-requisite industries that are beyond the reach of most
minority workers. (Wilson 1987: 109)
The interaction between the spatial mismatch and the growing skill
mismatch is a bridge between the human capital and spatial models for
uneven development. The recognition of this interrelationship is a prelude
to the circular causation model discussed below.
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Structural Explanations
In contrast to neoclassical theory in which the invisible hand of the
market works to discourage racial discrimination and lessen inequalities,
structural explanations assert that ghetto poverty is an artifact of the larger
economic system. The ghetto is viewed as a separate economy peripheral to
the economic mainstream. Researchers explain the creation and
perpetuation of ghetto poverty through social and economic processes that
create social and market dualism. This type of explanation looks at historical
context and inter-group power relationships (Mueller 1990). Individual acts
of discrimination may be harmful, but it is the economic system that ensures
that large numbers of minorities will work for low wages and live in
deteriorating areas. The most extreme voices for this school argue that the
creation of the underclass and areas of physical blight are an inevitable
outcome of capitalist economic development.
In the basic segmented labor market framework, workers find it
socially, psychologically, and technically difficult to move from one sector of
the economy to another. Race, sex, and class discrimination help maintain
this dualism. Jobs in the primary labor market pay relatively good wages and
employers value worker skill and longevity (Gordon 1972). Jobs in the
secondary labor market are characterized as low wage, menial jobs, with poor
conditions and no path for career advancement. Employers in the secondary
labor market do not place a high value on longevity or skill, and they do not
invest significantly in worker training. Ghetto residents are mostly confined
to the secondary labor market and often move between low-wage work,
informal economic activities, public assistance, and government job training
programs (Harrison 1974). This framework is articulated through the internal
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colonialism model, the less-developed-nations model, and the circular
causation model which differ from each other in details and in emphasis.

The Colony Analogy

The relationship between ghettos and the national economy bares
some similarity to internal colonialism: the ghetto is described as a 'less
developed country' with a severe 'balance of payments' deficit and with
'foreign' control of the most important local political and economic
institutions" (Harrison 1974). The legal relationship of the ghetto to the
larger economy does not resemble colonialism, but Blauner (1969) argues that
the process of interaction is similar. The four common elements of the
process are (1) involuntary entry, (2) policies imposing mainstream values at
the expense of indigenous ways of life, (3) institutionalization of colonial rule
through local government, (4) the oppressed group is "seen as inferior or
different in terms of alleged biological characteristics" and "exploited,
controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superiorordinate
group" (Blauner 1969 quoted by Harrison 1974). Outsiders control many
important ghetto institutions, like schools and police, contributing to the
sense that the ghetto is an occupied territory.

The Less-Developed Nation Analogy

Concepts from the study of less-developed nations in the world
economy have been applied to understanding American urban ghettos.
Structural dualism between the core and periphery can apply equally to both.
The ghetto serves as a vast reservoir of unemployed and under-employed
labor that is constantly replenished by migration and population growth. The
pool of unemployed workers keeps wage levels low which contributes to the
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economy by keeping costs low. Economic growth in the advanced sector does
not place strong upward pressure on wages in the periphery because the core
has a tendency to use relatively capital-intensive technology in spite of the
abundant supply of cheap labor. Actions in the public sector also contribute to
economic dualism by failing to provide adequate transportation, education,
and health facilities in the peripheral sector. The ghetto and mainstream
markets are not integrated sufficiently to allocate investment by relative rates
of return within and between the sectors (Harrison 1974).
The primary source of income in the ghetto is from low-wage
employment. Unskilled labor is the community's major export. Consumer
and capital goods are imported. Purchases are financed out of labor earnings
and transfer payments. Most income is earned outside the ghetto (Harrison
1974). Money flows out of the ghetto go to absentee landlords and purchases
of goods and services. Several studies document the "balance or trade" deficit
in which minority ghetto neighborhoods pay substantially more in taxes than
is returned in public expenditures in the area (Schaffer 1973, Harrison 1974).
Outward flows of income, capital, and human resources to the
rest of the economy serve to keep the ghetto in a permanently
underdeveloped state and feed the economic interests outside
the ghetto that have developed around those income flows, ...
The entire economy outside of the ghetto benefits from the
income, capital, and manpower resources that are drawn out,
just as it benefits from a pool of low-wage labor that provides
relatively low-cost services to those outside (Fusfeld and Bates
1984:145)
The less developed nation analogy suggests that like less developed
nations, ghetto economic development cannot be achieved through
monetary transfers: the connections between the depressed economy and the
mainstream economy need to be strengthened. The net outward drain of
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resources must stop to allow sufficient investment in physical and human
resources.

Circular Causation

The circular causation explanation is the most complex and complete
attempt to understand the processes of ghetto formation. It combines human
capital, spatial mismatch, discrimination, structural, and resource drain
explanations. More significantly, circular causation recognizes the self-reenforcing nature of underinvestment, disadvantage, and underachievement,
that complicates the path to advancement. Gunnar Myrdal (1964) first
introduced the term "cumulative causation" in The American Dilemma to
point out the negative feedback loops that make it impossible to disentangle
cause from effect in understanding the poverty of the underclass.
Fusfeld and Bates (1984) look at institutionalized economic processes to
explain the perpetuation of ghettos. Businesses in inner-city minority
communities lack of one or more of the essential elements of a healthy
business: (1) talented entrepreneurs, (2) access to information, (3) access to
financial capital, and (4) access to product markets. Neither black-owned
businesses nor other businesses have flourished in inner-city minority
communities. Successful ghetto firms tend to be smaller, use less labor and
are more likely to be headed by drop-outs than by college educated
entrepreneurs.
There is movement into and out of the ghetto. Fusfeld and Bates
identify three barriers to upward mobility that restrain movement out of the
ghetto: (1) race or ethnicity, (2) work and cultural patterns fostered in the
ghetto that do not allow many people to fit easily into mainstream society,
and (3) attitudes of people outside the ghetto which result in poor services in
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the ghetto and minimal acceptance of ghetto residents. These barriers are
played out in housing and job discrimination.
The ghetto economy perpetuates its own poverty because low incomes
mean a low standard of living in terms of food, housing, health, sanitation,
and education. High levels of crime are both a result and a contributing cause
to poor economic opportunities in poverty areas. These conditions reproduce
low labor productivity and perpetuate low incomes. "The drain of resources
out of urban poverty areas--manpower, capital, income--serves to reinforce
the poverty" (Fusfeld and Bates 1984: 151). Cumulatively these resource flows
create a self-sustaining system.
Economic growth is particularly difficult for the ghetto economy.
Its weak infrastructure, lack of local initiative and
entrepreneurship, and the shortage of capital make it difficult to
generate a growth process. They create instead a self-generating
poverty cycle. More important, the tendency for resources and
income to drain out of the ghetto economy means that even if
the forces of development were to appear, much of their
strength would be dissipated before they had a significant impact
on the ghetto itself. Any program or programs that seek to
improve the economy of urban poverty areas must reverse the
drain of skilled manpower, capital, and income if a cumulative
process of growth is to be established. (Fusfeld and Bates 1984:
152)
The process of circular causation with cumulative effects tends to
preserve the ghetto in a relatively stable position from one generation to the
next, even though population size and income levels may change. Programs
that provide improved services to individuals, like education, training,
housing, and health services, address the symptoms, not the causes of urban
ghettos. If they are large enough and sustained long enough, such programs
can make a contribution, but helping individuals will not increase prosperity
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in the ghetto as long as the social and economic processes that create the
ghetto remain in place (Fusfeld and Bates 1984).
The fundamental processes that create and perpetuate the ghetto
include a constant drain in human and capital resources combined with
informal barriers that inhibit movement out of the ghetto for many people.
Fusfeld and Bates (1984) state that the ghetto becomes home to people
excluded from other social subsystems for a combination of the following five
reasons: (1) race, (2) recent arrival, (3) cultural differences, (4) low earning
power from lack of skills, poor health, etc., and (5) low income. The
"underclass" can be distinguished from low income individuals in general by
its isolation from mainstream values, behaviors, and the labor market
(Ricketts 1992).
There are no physical barriers between the ghetto and the rest of
society, and no formal methods by which individuals are
'committed' to life in the ghetto. The barriers are economic and
social rather than physical, and the selection process is informal.
(Fusfeld and Bates 1984: 149)
Professional people who provide personal and business services leave,
as do other talented people who can earn more money outside the ghetto.
The lack of political power in federal, state, and sometimes local public
finance decisions lead to inadequate local control and public investment.
Capital resources leave through the allocation of public resources, the
investment practices of banks, and through deferred maintenance on real
property.
The circular causation explanation includes the notion of structural
discrimination. In contrast to the conventional economic view that the
market will weed out discrimination in the absence of what Becker (1971)
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calls a "taste for discrimination," discrimination is part of the structure of the
economy. By gaining convenience and low wages, employers may maximize
profits while contributing to racial inequality. Prejudice and institutional
employment practices work together to make race a barrier to economic
advancement. Much discrimination in the market is unintentional and
hidden beneath traditional modes of operation (Schiller 1988).
Discrimination and inequality in the educational system compounds
discrimination in the labor market to the disadvantage of minority workers.
Some employers willfully exclude racial minorities, others "rely on
recruitment procedures that have the same effect on minority racial groups"
(Schiller 1988: 162). Relying heavily on existing employees for recruits works
against would-be minority applicants who do not have a network of contacts
already in better employment positions. Low-income minorities are seldom
aware of unadvertised employment opportunities and are rarely brought to
the attention of recruitment personnel (Schiller 1988: 154) Traditional
recruitment agencies and advertising forums are more accessible to current
members of the economic mainstream. Minority employees hesitate to apply
for jobs where they risk embarrassment or harassment.
Breaking the cyclical processes of ghetto formation requires
intervention in job market discrimination and reversing the drain of skilled
personnel, capital, and income. Policy interventions to relocate residents or
job opportunities to a closer geographic proximity would have minimal
impact since they do not deal with the human factors contributing to
pervasive poverty (Galster 1992). The ghetto experience becomes internalized
in the values and behaviors of members of the underclass, complicating the
transition to the mainstream economy.
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Economic Development Strategies for Poverty Areas
The multidimensional problems of poverty areas call for a
comprehensive strategy. Economic development programs to counter ghetto
poverty and racial inequality typically involve one or more of the following.

Minority Entrepreneurial Strategy
The minority entrepreneurial model focuses on conventional capitalist
institutions like private ownership and profit maximization. Some public
sector programs focus on improving the profitability and viability of blackowned businesses. Such support is justified by past inequities. The Small
Business Administration, (SBA) and Office of Economic Opportunity
provided low-interest loans for small minority-owned businesses. Minority
business set aside programs for public procurement and technical assistance
also hold potential in business development (Harrison 1974).

Community Economic Development
Community economic development focuses on collective action,
ownership of property by community residents, and institution building
(Harrison 1974). Leaders urge residents to spend money within the
community to stem the outward flow of wealth. Community development
corporations work to improve the entire community by channeling capital,
technical skills, and various kinds of assistance into target inner-city
neighborhoods (Fusfeld and Bates 1984). These efforts focus on consciousness
raising and reducing the outward flow of resources from the area.
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Equal Opportunity
The equal opportunity approach focuses on breaking down the barriers
that hold talented poor people from climbing the economic ladder.
Affirmative action, minority scholarships, anti-discrimination laws, and
minority set-asides in government procurement are the most common
examples. Encouraging and assisting individuals in their career growth sets
an example that people can work their way out of the ghetto. Monitoring of
discriminatory employment practices also keeps pressure on firms to provide
equal opportunities. Multicultural education efforts attempt to change
attitudes and behaviors that lie at the heart of intergroup alienation and
discrimination.

Human Capital Investment
Investment in human capital seeks to improve the earning power of
the poor through increased productivity. Individuals need education, health,
and marketable skills to succeed in the economic mainstream (Hanson 1983).
Federal and state funding of human capital development in low revenue
jurisdictions is necessary to provide quality services in poor areas.

Locational Intervention
In the spatial mismatch hypothesis the economic troubles of the ghetto
are primarily spatial. Getting outside firms to locate in the ghetto bringing
jobs with them or relocating families to affordable housing in the suburbs can
counter the concentration of the urban jobless in poverty areas. Policies
include enhanced public transit access to suburban work sites and
inclusionary zoning to promote dispersed low income housing around the
metropolitan area.
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Job Creation
The government can work toward full employment by creating public
service employment for the urban jobless or through macroeconomic policies
promoting job growth (Wilson 1987). The key is increasing the availability of
employment at living wages.

Connections Between Theory and Practice
The following chapter documents that state enterprise zones combine
community economic development, human capital investment, locational
intervention, and job creation economic development strategies (See Table 31 for a summary of the relationships between strategies and models). There
are few examples of integration of the minority entrepreneurial or economic
opportunity approaches to reversing economic distress. The twin emphases
of the enterprise zone strategy for job creation are combating the spatial
mismatch and creating jobs through reducing the costs of doing business.
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Table 3-1. Correspondence Between Theories and Policies
Model
Policy
Human
Utility
Spatial
Structural Theory
Capital
Mismatch
Circular
Causation
Minority
+
++
Entrepreneurial
Development
Community Economic
Development
Equal Opportunity

+++

+

+++

+++

++
++

+++

Human Capital
Investment

+++

Locational Intervention
Job Creation

+

+

Tax breaks to lower the
costs of doing business*

+

Key
no apparent connection between the policy and the theory
+
there is a weak connection between the policy and some element of the
theory
++ the policy deals directly with at least one of the elements of the theory
+++ the policy addresses the primary element of the theory
*this policy was not discussed in this chapter, but is included in the table
because of its primary importance in enterprise zone programs. If zones were
effective at creating jobs within zones they would be combating the spatial
mismatch by bringing jobs closer to poor populations.

This review of enterprise zones and of theories of ghetto economic
development suggest that a successful enterprise zone must (1) attenuate the
drain of human and financial capital, (2) counter labor market
discrimination, (3) provide adequate levels of public investment in human
capital, and (4) facilitate the integration of ghetto and mainstream economies.
In addition, if small business owners are to benefit from the program as

entrepreneurs, their needs for financial capital, access to product markets, and
technical assistance must be overcome. Increased economic growth at the
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state level may trickle down into areas of concentrated poverty, but without
intervention, the forces of economic dualism will maintain pockets of
concentrated poverty even amid prosperity.

31

CHAPTER4
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON ENTERPRISE ZONES AND RACE

Benefits of Enterprise Zones for Inner City Minorities
As a prelude to Chapter Five, which looks at official evaluation studies
of state enterprise zone programs, this chapter reviews the existing literature
on the benefits of enterprise zones for members of minority communities as
workers and entrepreneurs. There is no substantial body of research on this
topic, but a handful of writers have published their preliminary findings and
raised some important questions, criticisms and hypotheses.
The most patent oversight in existing evaluations of enterprise zones
is the general inattention to the demographic characteristics of the
individuals and areas that benefit. All but one or two studies ignore the race
issue entirely. For this reason the empirical evidence presented in this
chapter is patchy and inconclusive. The second half of this chapter outlines a
number of criticisms of enterprise zones relating to their potential to benefit
minorities: failure to effectively target needy minority populations, lack of
support for small start-ups with limited capital and expertise, failure to assure
adequate levels of investment in infrastructure and human capital
development, and inattention to diverse needs. There is growing evidence
that tax incentives by themselves are not the right tool to reverse the cycle of
decay in distressed urban areas or to combat the racial segregation and
inequality that characterize such neighborhoods. However, even enterprise
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zone critics maintain optimism that more comprehensive enterprise zone
programs may be able to show tangible results.

Minority participation in zone employment
By 1993, thirty-seven states had enterprise zone legislation and 25
reported job creation resulting from their programs (Rubin and College 1994).
Wilder and Rubin (1996) document substantial variation in the proportion of
new jobs going to ]ow and moderate income persons and the numbers going
to zone residents. New or retained jobs held by low or moderate income
persons range from 13 percent in Michigan City, Indiana to 90 percent in
Thief River Falls, Minnesota. The range was wider for jobs held by zone
residents: 2 to 90 percent. On average, 20 to 30 percent of new jobs went to
zone residents. The sample based evaluation of the California zone program
suggests that the California zone program is successfully reaching the target
population; of the 1,800 new jobs 1,151 went to economically disadvantaged
persons.
Glover provides the first empirical evidence of the effects of enterprise
zones on minority employment (Harris 1992). She surveyed zone
administrators in 24 different states and received 101 responses. Based on this
sample Glover found that minorities are actually over-represented in
enterprise-zone jobs: 38 percent of the employees in the zones are minorities
compared to 26 percent of zone residents (Glover 1993). This study still leaves
several questions unanswered. For instance, we do not know what type of
employment minorities find or what conditions lead to higher levels of
minority employment.
Beyond the question of who benefits from zones, there is doubt about
their true job creation impact. Some enterprise zones have not created job
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growth at all. Most studies measure jobs created or retained on an absolute
basis, instead of measuring net job growth. Of the studies that also measured
job loss, many have found it to be significant (Wilder and Rubin 1996). In fact
some experienced net job losses. Both the success stories and the low
performers need to be interpreted with caution because they are not
controlled to separate job change attributable to the zone from the underlying
economic trends. Dowall, Beyler, and Wong (1994) were forced to conclude
that zone initiatives in California "were not conclusively associated with any
of the estimated positive outcomes (Wilder and Rubin 1996). The U.S.
General Accounting Office (1989) study of Maryland zones found no clear
causal link between job growth and zone designation or incentives. On a
more positive side, Rubin and Wilder (1989) used shift-share analysis and
found positive job growth attributable to the Evansville Zone in Indiana.
Many evaluations use methods that ignore the issue entirely.
Despite HUD' s consistently positive evaluations of enterprise zones,
the Congressional Black Caucus disputes the zones' effectiveness (Harris
1992). The Board of Economists assembled by Black Enterprise magazine for a
symposium on enterprise zones gave them a less than favorable review. The
Board concluded that enterprise zones' ten-year history demonstrates an
emphasis on traditional economic development and public relations without
any serious effort to target minority workers. No comprehensive research
shows enterprise zones to be ineffective at improving economic conditions
for minorities, yet evidence from case studies illustrates some of the ways
programs can fail.
Irons (1994) reports that enterprise zones frequently fail to serve the
targeted community. A 175 acre enterprise zone was created contiguous to a
low-income housing project with predominantly black residents. The zone's
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stated objective was to provide opportunities for the housing project's
residents. Irons laments:
Our objective was to get the businesses in the enterprise zone to
hire the people in the housing project. But there were all kinds
of excuses: 'We couldn't train them. We couldn't find them.
We couldn't keep them, just one excuse after another. It was
hard to refute some of this ... but we felt we were being
circumvented. (cited in McCoy 1993)
The enterprise zone administrators did not have tools to identify and avoid
racially discriminatory hiring practices by zone firms or to train targeted
residents to meet employer needs.
A 1983 evaluation of the enterprise zone program in Maryland touted
the creation of 1,755 new jobs during a period when enterprise zone firms
claimed corporate income tax credits for employing only 49 economically
disadvantaged persons statewide Gones 1987). A study of New Jersey's
enterprise zones found that 40 percent of zone businesses were unable to hire
zone residents for 25 percent of their new positions as required to qualify for
zone benefits. Firms explained this by claiming they could not operate
profitably if they hired zone residents for 25 percent of their positions
(Levitan and Miller 1992). Firms cited the need for better trained workers as a
key reason they did not hire more zone residents. These negative examples
suggest some of the barriers that may undermine the potential benefits of
enterprise zones for minority communities.

Enterprise zones do not have magical qualities that can
overcome all physical, social, and economic barriers to
revitalization. In this respect, zone critics are correct in arguing
that the myriad social and physical problems plaguing many
urban neighborhoods (e.g. decaying infrastructure, high crime
rates, inadequate school systems) are not responsive to targeted
development incentives. (Wilder and Rubin 1996)
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The one unexpected finding about enterprise zones and minority
communities comes from regression analysis performed by Erickson,
Friedman, and McCluskey (1989) in a cross sectional-study aimed at
understanding the conditions associated with successful enterprise zones
(Wilder and Rubin 1996).

The percentage of minorities in the zone

population was one of only a few variables positively correlated with
investment and employment growth. There is no obvious causal relation,
but at the very least this indicates that many of the more successful zones are
located in areas with higher minority population.

Type of enterprise zone employment for minorities
Few studies of enterprise zones have documented the skill levels,
wages, or duration of the jobs created (Wilder and Rubin 1996). One valid
concern is that a policy that provides minimum wage jobs to minority
workers will not significantly improve the long-term opportunities and
economic prosperity of minority families. Any meaningful job program for
disadvantaged minority populations must have a long-term goal of helping
minorities into career-path jobs that pay more than minimum wage.
Within enterprise zones, minority-owned firms and minority
employees tend to be most highly concentrated in low-wage services (Glover
1993). Twelve percent of new jobs in the 101 enterprise zones surveyed by
Glover were minimum wage jobs, compared to 7.9 percent of jobs in the
national economy. Seventy-eight percent of zone administrators reported
that at least some of the new jobs in their zones paid minimum wage. These
figures are unsurprising since enterprise zones are targeted toward firms that
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are particularly sensitive to factor costs and because much of the available
labor in enterprise zones is low-skilled.

Minority entrepreneurs participation in zone programs
Only two researchers have looked at participation in zone programs by
minority entrepreneurs. In Glover's survey only 5.3% of firms within zones
were minority-owned, making minority firm ownership levels within
enterprise zones similar to comparable economic areas without enterprise
zone designation. Many minority owners in the survey did not participate in
the enterprise zone program (Glover 1993). While the sample of minority
firms is quite small, it appears that the pattern of minority firm participation
in the zones differs from non-minority participation. Jones (1987) also found
low levels of participation by minority-owned businesses in his case study. Of
the sixty black-owned businesses in Decatur, Illinois, ten are in the zone and
only one participates in any way in the zone program. While the numbers
are too small to draw firm conclusions, these studies raise strong doubts about
whether enterprise zones assist minority-owned firms. Levels of
participation of minority-owned firms should be included in future
evaluation studies to provide more useful data.
Glover's survey provides one clue to understanding low minority
owner participation. Glover (1993) found that minority-owned firms in
enterprise zones are concentrated in personal and business services. Overall,
personal and business services tend to be underrepresented in the enterprise
zones Glover surveyed. Older zones, with older firms have larger
manufacturing firms and a more diversified mix of smaller firms supporting
greater numbers of small service firms, like food services, that serve the
employee and business markets. These service firms are "likely to be
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relatively small, have a higher probability of minority ownership, and a
higher percentage of minority employment" (Glover 1993:87). Because
minorities own more service firms and start-up barriers are lower,
encouraging economic diversification within the zones may lead to higher
minority business ownership and employment.

The Participation Gap: Barriers and Flaws
Targeting disadvantaged and minority populations
Although job creation and economic recovery are explicit goals of
enterprise zone programs, zones do not explicitly address the underlying
problem of low rates of minority business ownership and employment
(Glover 1993). For the most part, enterprise zones fail to acknowledge the
specificity of race; they marginalize minority concerns instead of strategically
incorporating them into program goals.
Jones (1987) surveyed local black business people as part of his case
study to learn about some of the reasons for non-participation. Local black
business people gave three reasons for low program participation Oones 1987:
4):

1. Unfamiliarity with the program operation and types of
incentives offered.

2. The program's complexity, possibly requiring the advice of tax
consultants.
3. The program seemed to benefit large firms, not small blackowned firms that needing access to venture capital and technical
assistance in starting small businesses.

Black entrepreneurs have historically been excluded from economic
development initiatives, and in the absences of efforts to specifically reach out
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to them and to help them overcome barriers to participation, minority
business people may exclude themselves through non-participation. The
failure to assess the needs of minority entrepreneurs and to market the
program to minority entrepreneurs are two of the program's shortcomings.

Start-up barriers
Enterprise zones are supposedly the key to generating new small
businesses in the inner-city. Peter Hall argued that the abundance of
regulations surrounding opening and running a business inhibits inner-city
residents from exercising their entrepreneurial spirit (Hall 1982). The pure
supply-side enterprise zone concept does not address the barriers inner-city
entrepreneurs face in securing start-up capital. Without capital, minorityowned firms will not be able to take advantage of the other incentives offered
in enterprise zones.
Some enterprise zone incentives benefit certain types of firms. Tax
relief provides minimal incentive for start-up businesses since such
businesses rarely have much income to pay taxes on in the first years, but tax
relief can be a monumental benefit to larger firms with professional
accountants (Hall 1982, Harrison 1982). Enterprise zones could even hurt
minority enterprises by bringing in outside firms that compete with existing
firms for the local market. Thus the type of incentives included in
prototypical enterprise zones are prejudicial in practice against minority
entrepreneurs and start-up firms in general.

Public goods and services
Many critics of the enterprise zone approach claim that supply-side
incentives cannot jump start depressed geographic areas without direct public
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investment in social and physical infrastructure (Gunn 1993, Levitan and
Miller 1992). Successful enterprise zone programs therefore must include
direct public expenditures to attract and complement private investment.
However, in some places the withdrawal of public investment is so severe
that it outweighs incentives provided by enterprise zone programs. A 1988
study of the Anacostia Community enterprise zone in southwestern
Washington indicated that problems of high crime, high insurance, and
banks' reluctance to lend inhibited any new businesses from locating in the
zone communities (Glover 1993). As Harrison (1982) notes:
The rapid deterioration of these public goods in the older cities -and their unfinished status in the new cities of the sunbelt -- has
become a serious bottleneck to further private investment in
these areas. In short the fiscal crisis of the state directly
contradicts the developmental objectives of the whole enterprise
zone concept. (Harrison 1982: 425).

Large-scale changes are necessary to overcome the barriers in severely
depressed urban areas. Enterprise zones do not change the fiscal inequalities
of the current tax system that virtually ensure that some areas will be unable
to provide adequate services and infrastructure. Some enterprise zones give
preference to zones for state and federal grant money to provide a temporary
infusion of outside money. As long as important public services and
infrastructure are funded from local taxes, there is little hope to overcome the
geographic inequalities of income and quality of life.
Lack of jobs is only one factor in the complex cycle of poverty.
Investment in affordable housing, education, job training, and crime
prevention benefit low-income minority populations (Glover 1993). Even
relatively unskilled jobs require some basic skills and basic stability. To
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address these deficits, some state zone programs combine more
comprehensive social programs with other incentives. Investment in both
people and places are important foundations for economic growth. Elling
and Sheldon (1991) found that state economic development policies were a
key variable in zone success. They found the most successful zones
complemented tax incentives with other kinds of support (Wilder and Rubin
1996).

Community involvement
Gunn (1993) concluded that state enterprise zone programs, like the
ones in New Jersey and Indiana, that emphasize neighborhood or
community involvement in solving long-range problems are more
successful than those, like Connecticut's, that only emphasize tax incentives.
"The economic, material, social, and political linkages that make a small area
into a neighborhood or community are not addressed by enterprise zones.
Yet these linkages are the are critical determinants of the vitality of the
community investment process" (Clarke 1982). Jones discovered some
deficiencies in enterprise zones that limit the effectiveness of the program for
the black community:
For black communities in areas such as Decatur, enterprise zone
programs may have only a minimal effect on neighborhood
revitalization and business growth and development. However,
with provisions for public participation of all sectors of the
community in program design, implementation and evaluation;
management assistance for potential entrepreneurs, marketing
the program to black businesses and residents, and investment
pools for development financing, enterprise zones may become
more product than promise. Gones 1987: 6)
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In sum, the incomplete information about the benefits of enterprise zones for
minority populations tells a mixed story suggesting substantial variation
between zones. There is little evidence to show that "pure" enterprise zones
that rely on tax and regulatory breaks are effective, but researchers like Jones
and Gunn are still optimistic about diversified programs that involve
community members in planning for improved services, job training,
economic development, and education (Jones 1987, Gunn 1993). The next
step is to design enterprise zone evaluations with these questions in mind so
that more firm conclusions can be drawn.

42

CHAPTERS
ISSUES OF RACE AND MINORITY EQUITY IN
STATE SPONSORED ENTERPRISE ZONE EVALUATIONS

This chapter examines how existing evaluations of enterprise zones
address the topic of minority welfare. As explained in Chapter 1, the
evaluations reviewed here come from Colorado (1995), Florida (1993), New
Jersey (Rubin and Armstrong 1989), Texas (Alwin 1994), and Wisconsin
(1993). Each one is an official study conducted to inform state decisionmakers about the efficacy of their enterprise zone program. The chapter is
divided into three sections focusing on the program goals articulated in the
reports, evidence of targeting benefits toward people or places, and finally a
look at the conclusions evaluators drew about program success.
The goals, targeting mechanisms, and evaluation criteria of enterprise
zone programs help explain why so few claims have been published about
enterprise zone benefits for urban minorities. There is general inattention to
racial inequity or its particular relationship to areas of concentrated urban
poverty. Zone programs target poor persons by various means based on
criteria such as residence in an area of concentrated poverty and individual
economic disadvantage, but goals or evaluation criteria do not generally
emphasize the same characteristics as the zone incentives. The agenda is
divided between assisting disadvantaged people and improving the zone as a
place. Zone evaluators do not fully appreciate the distinction between
targeting benefits toward a specific population of people vs. a geographic area.
Programs can be successful at one without succeeding at the other (e.g.,
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gentrification). The principal finding from this review of enterprise zone
evaluations is the weak link between the structure of the programs, what they
intend to accomplish, and what accomplishments they measure. The lack of
intellectual clarity identified in Chapter 4, between the structure of zone
programs and our understanding of concentrated poverty areas, is reflected in
the mismatch observed in the state evaluation reports.
Two operational definitions need to be clarified before jumping into
the discussion in this chapter: benefiting or targeting people vs. places. I
make the distinction based on the unit of analysis implied by the wording in
the evaluation report. When a goal or incentive uses individuals as the unit
of analysis then I identify it as targeting people, whereas if the geographic area
of the zone was the unit of analysis, it targets a place. The distinction might
not always be intentional on the part of the writer. For example, employing
the unemployed is a goal targeting people. Decreasing the unemployment
rate in the zone is a goal targeting a characteristic of a place. Creating jobs for
zone residents targets people. Creating jobs in the zone targets a place.
As an illustration of the distinction, creating jobs or reducing
unemployment in a zone could be done without any positive economic
impact on the zone residents: if new jobs go to outsiders, people commute
into the zone from outside without employing more zone residents. The
zone unemployment rate could decline as the result of increased
employment of residents or because unemployed residents moved out or
stopped actively seeking work. The differences can be important.

The Relevance of Racial Inequity and Urban Poverty by State
Racial inequity and urban poverty are not of equal importance in every
state in terms of the number of persons below the poverty line or the
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proportion concentrated in the inner city, but they are relevant to discussions
on poverty in all five of the study states (Table 5-1). In all cases, race and
Hispanic origin and location of residence are important predictors of poverty.
All five states have large differences between the poverty rates for white, non
Hispanics compared to the rest of the population (Figures 5-1 and 5-2). Also
unsurprisingly, poverty rates in metropolitan areas are higher within the
central city than elsewhere in the metropolitan area in all five states (figures
not shown). Among the five states, roughly one quarter of all persons below
the poverty line in 1989 are minorities living in the central city of a
metropolitan area.
Table 5-1. Poverty in Five States by Central City Residence and Minority
Status

Colorado
Florida
New Jersey
Texas
Wisconsin

Total
Persons in
population poverty

Total
minority
population

3,294,394
375,214
12,937,926 1,604,186
7,730,188
573,152
16,986,510 3,000,515
4,891,769 508,545

629,220
3,449,230
1,995,622
6,665,631
422,678

Percent of All Persons Below the
Poverty Line in 1989
Living in
Minority
Minority and
Central City
living in C. City
47%
40%
24%
37%
51 %
24%
43%
58%
35%
41 %
53%
68%
25%
51%
29%

Note: Central Cities are as defined by the U.S. Census of Population.
Minorities are defined as the entire population minus white, non-Hispanic
persons.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993.
Figure 5-1. Poverty Rates in Five States
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993.
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Figure 5-2. Poverty Rates in Central Cities within Metropolitan Areas
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Note: Central City classification equals persons living in the central city of a
metropolitan area as defined by the U.S. Census of Population.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993.

The Goals of Enterprise Zone Programs
Plans can have multiple layers of goals including goals explicitly
articulated in the plan document and the often unwritten goals of the
multiple actors. The stated goals of enterprise zones vary, but goals
statements generally include economic growth in terms of investment and
jobs, employing the unemployed, improving the welfare of zone residents,
and physical rehabilitation of the area. Haar et al. (1982: 8) summarized the
purpose of American enterprise zones:
The goal of the American strain of urban enterprise zones is to
bring about a change in the conditions of our devastated inner
cities--to tum around their pattern of decay. To achieve such a
reversal, the areas selected as enterprise zones would, ideally, be
endowed with an image of economic buoyancy which, in turn,
would help the zone attract business, employ the unemployed,
and improve the lives of zone residents and the areas in which
they live and work.
The five programs examined in this study all touch on improving the
economic conditions of a place while only two included improving the
economic situation of people in their goal statement (fable 5-2). Texas
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reserves the prerogative of goals setting to local government; reducing
unemployment is the only state goal mentioned. Only the Florida Office of
the Auditor General (1993) and the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau
(1993) refer to the goal of assisting "disadvantaged" or unemployed workers.
Florida Office of the Auditor General (1993) uses language like "community
conservation" and makes it plain that the business development program
exists to benefit the people living in poverty areas and the economically
disadvantaged regardless of their home address. None of the five states
include goals explicitly regarding benefits to minority populations.
Enterprise zone program components and evaluations are not
narrowly designed around program goals. For example, with the
uncontrolled growth of Colorado enterprise zone, the program is not
narrowly targeted toward the most economically distressed people or areas. It
is more of an overall business tax relief program. Evaluation criteria also
reveal new layers of goals, like improving the state economy and tax base
which are the foci of the evaluation in New Jersey. This study does not
critically analyze the forces shaping enterprise zones program formation, but
the preceding examples illustrate how multiple, often unwritten, agendas
contribute to program design, implementation, and evaluation. Of the five
studies examined, only New Jersey evaluators felt that the program had
achieved its goals, and this is the only evaluation that did not reference the
original intent of the program or question who benefited from the zone
program. The four studies that were less favorable highlight the original
goals of the state enterprise zone program and the need to measure socioeconomic conditions of targeted areas or populations.
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Targeting on Three Levels
Enterprise zones target groups of people and geographic areas in three
ways: zone selection criteria, qualifications for receiving incentives, and the
nature of the incentives themselves. The first two are obvious targeting
mechanisms, but the nature of the incentives influences who benefits in
discernible ways. Among the five states, the most popular way to target
people was to tie benefits like corporate income tax credits to hiring zone
residents or previous recipients of public assistance. Incentives targeted
toward places seek to create jobs, induce businesses to fix up property, and
increase business investment within the zones by tying tax breaks to certain
activities that take place within the zones. Only the New Jersey report (Rubin
and Armstrong 1989) mentions minority status at all. The following state-bystate analysis gives more detail about how each program is targeted on each of
the three levels.
Taken together, the targeting mechanisms demonstrate an intent to
target economically disadvantaged people and places. The dual agenda of
targeting people and targeting places, makes it hard to determine what
outcome is desired and how it should be measured. Evaluators had difficulty
measuring success with either approach because of the dearth of appropriate
data and the use of inadequate evaluation methods.
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* The program in Texas is a state authorized and supported local initiative,

with goal setting left to the local government unit. Reducing unemployment
is the basic goal of the state program.
GP A = General Public Assistance.
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Zone Selection Criteria
There is conflict in zone selection criteria between giving zone
designation to the most distressed areas and giving the incentives to less poor
areas that show greater development potential. Criteria in all five states seek
to leverage tax breaks and investment in zones though a competitive zone
selection process. The zone selection criteria and observations about their
application in each state tell a very interesting story about how variable zone
selection is between states.
Colorado's selection criteria do not ensure that the areas selected will be
extreme poverty areas. Unemployment at least 125% the state average, slow
population growth, and per capita income less than 75% the state average are
the "economic distress" criteria. Zone applications are also judged based on
local plans and economic development initiatives by government and the
private sector. The distress criteria apply to the overall zone although zones
are drawn as oddly shaped, non-contiguous areas that do not even roughly
correspond to census geography. Evaluators could not obtain accurate figures
on the distress of zones. The law authorizes up to 16 zones, but 83
amendments expanding zones have been approved since 1987, mostly in
response to private business or local government requests for inclusion. In
1990, 24 sites were added that had no resident population. Evaluators felt
practice entirely circumvents the distress criteria because the addition of an
unpopulated, undeveloped site cannot change the overall unemployment or
poverty characteristics of the zone even if it is located in a very prosperous
area.
The Florida Enterprise Zone has the most well articulated selection
process. Areas are scored on a checklist of items with 65% of the application
score based on distress criteria including housing, income, employment, and
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property value characteristics. Local participation factors are the remaining
35% of the score. They include local tax incentives, commitments for
redevelopment investment, targeting grant money to the zone, and
commitment to additional local government services. Florida stratifies the
competition by city size category to allow some of the zones to be in smaller
cities. These zone criteria seem to emphasize valid measures of distress like
the percent of population living below the poverty level while
simultaneously using competition for zone designation as a way to leverage
local planning and commitments.
Texas' criteria focus on identifying contiguous areas that are both poor
and deteriorating. Areas must be at least a square mile in area with over
150% of the state unemployment rate sustained over a 12 month period or
have a 9% population loss over 6 years. If that test is met, areas must meet
one of several distress scenarios: poverty, UDAG eligibility, chronic
abandonment, tax arrearages, substantial loss of business or be declared part of
a state or federal disaster area. City or county government may designate up
to three zones as long as they meet minimum standards. The real
competition in Texas is for Enterprise Project designation. Similar to Florida,
Texas divides the scoring process for Enterprise Projects between distress
criteria and local effort using a 60-40 formula.
New Jersey's selection criteria focus on potential for success and local
commitment, with relatively weak criteria dealing with economic distress.
There is a long list of preference policies for zone selection, including "the
degree of commitment by public and private entities to utilize minority
contractors and assure equal opportunities for employment in construction or
reconstruction in the area" (Rubin and Armstrong 1989: 16) This is the only
reference to benefiting minorities in any of the selection criteria.
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Wisconsin selects zones based on the quality of the local development
plan and the zone meeting two out of six economic distress criteria. These
criteria include high unemployment, AFDC dependence, decline in assessed
property values, low income, UDAG eligibility, and at least 5% of the work
force in the jurisdiction being permanently laid-off in the preceding 18
months. These criteria would allow long-term poverty areas to be designated
as zones but also would allow working class areas that have experienced
recent economic downturns to qualify.

Requirements to Receive Incentives
Unsurprisingly, many surveys indicate businesses prefer zone
incentives with the fewest strings attached. Many states have strict
requirements for businesses certification to receive tax credits in conjunction
with the program. Administrators have found a trade-off between
administrative simplicity and sending the desired economic message to firms
through specific requirements. Where requirements are weak, like giving job
credits for all new hires in the zone, documentation of who receives jobs,
employment duration, and wages is generally lacking.
Conditions imposed to qualify for incentives in different states vary
widely, falling evenly between incentives tied to benefiting people and those
targeted toward places. The following state by state overview focuses only on
conditions imposed to qualify for specific benefits, not on the benefits
themselves. Table 5-3 summarizes the requirements tied to incentives. The
states intend these conditions to target benefits and motivate specific actions.

52

Table 5-3. Requirement to Receive Incentives

I
:co f FL I NJ 1 TX ~ WI I
j Employing disadvantaged workers
X ! X i X i X [
1°.E.mpfoy1ng. .ione. res"I«fei\ts·· · ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . Ti ..............f~ ····'5c·T
... '5(····r··..·x-···r··. ·········1
i

Hiring employees at low wages

j

i

!

X

j

!

l

§£E~i.~~~~-~~~~~~~~!~~~~:~r~~~I~---~=====~r=:~==c::::~~:~=t==::~1=:~:.~:.:~1=:=:~:~J
l[BT~~i=ii~-~-~Provi~i~g ~ealth insurance to new hires
~ X !
I
! !
i

Rehab1htation of zone property
j X ; X , X :
j
!
:.................................................................... ............................................................................. ,................>···············t................................................
i New construction in zone
!
l
I X j
j
1
'·------------------------·----------------------···-···----------------------.------·-··--4------·-··--:-··--····:·····-··--:
j Purchase business equipment for use in zone
i X 1 X ! X !
i X 1
! New business in the zone
! X ;
,
,
,
j

t" r>ieJ>.ar.a"tl"on. orne·w-·hiisffi·e·;;5··5he . wlihin . io.ile···············r···············r·············· ··············-r············r··-:;c···i
f'Xdcfing-valuetoagrfcuffuraT..prod.ucts·--·· --------------····-1-···:x----r------- ----··--·---r--··········r---1
development in zone ! X 1
j
l X ~
!i" Performing
conirihii'tI"Onresearch
. to. .ione.and
JJr.og.ram
. o.r. .iJio}ecT. . . . . . . . . . . . . r. )c·r . x·. T·! . x· . ·r············r·
. · ·. . . .l
•.•.•• •.u.-...-.o.o.o.o,o,-.o......_o• • -.-.., ........,., .• _..._..,_. .• ,, ,,.• • •• """""~"

~-.~•o.o.••o.•~··••• • .-••••••.-••••••••••-.•••, ••••••-...•

........-.... -.-..,.......-0.• .....-.o •••••-••••••••.,. •••••V•••-...• • ••..,,._...o.-•,_ .•.-. •.••.-•.-•.o•.o.•$"°"'"°"'""""" •••.••,....-.•_._.. •..._ ••.•.• . • . ••• •••• .-.-." • ••• •••••~

Wisconsin gives tax incentives to zone businesses that hire individuals
from any one of 11 categories of populations including AFDC recipients,
dislocated workers, economically disadvantaged youth, and General
Assistance recipients. Businesses preparing new sites in the zone, businesses
expanding or purchases new equipment for use in the zone and businesses
doing research in the zone qualify for specific credits.
Texas grants incentives to businesses located in zones, and extra
assistance if 25 percent of new hires are zone residents or economically
disadvantaged.1 Competitive selection as a designated Enterprise Project
provides the highest level of tax relief.
In Colorado all the targeted zone incentives are tied to improving the
zone, none are targeted toward disadvantaged people or zone residents.
Incentives flow to new businesses or businesses hiring new employees,
investing in equipment, adding value to agricultural commodities, insuring
new employees through a qualifying health insurance company, performing
lThe term "economically disadvantaged" is given no operational definition in the statute, nor
by the report of the Auditor General.
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research and development in the zone, rehabilitating a vacant commercial
building, or making financial contributions to zone programs.
Florida is unique in that it allows businesses located anywhere in the
state to qualify for some tax exemptions if they hire residents of enterprise
zones, previous AFDC recipients, or JTP A participants. Incentives are also
available to any Florida business contributing revenues to approved
development projects within zones. Incentives for purchasing or
rehabilitating business property are only available to businesses located in a
zone.
New Jersey gives incentives to firms hiring employees if at least 25% of
new hires fall in at least one of four categories: 1) resident of a NJ zone, 2)
unemployed for at least a year prior to being hired and residing in NJ, 3)
recipient of NJ Public Assistance programs for at least a year, or 4) any person
determined to be economically disadvantage pursuant to JPT A. Additional
tax breaks are available to qualified firms for purchase of equipment, services,
construction materials, or for investments that contribute to the economic
attractiveness of the zone. The one peculiar requirement tied to a financial
incentive is the unemployment insurance rebate for hiring new employees
with gross salaries less than $4,500 per quarter.
While race has no bearing on qualifying for any of the incentives, the
definitions of "targeted populations" used in Florida, New Jersey, Texas, and
Wisconsin can do exactly that in a non-discriminatory manner. The only way
to judge whether these definitions target minorities would be to document
the percentage of minorities that fall within the targeted groups and the
percentage of minorities receiving jobs tied to zone incentives.
The requirements in Colorado are the least likely to provide benefits to
minorities. The tax credits for new hires make no restrictions on whom the
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firm hires. Colorado qualifications place a high emphasis on fixing up
physical property, but even those improvements may not benefit poor
neighborhoods if they are not located within areas of concentrated poverty.
Alternatively, physical rehabilitation without programs to benefit residents
can lead to gentrification and displacement. By going beyond zone
boundaries, the Florida and New Jersey incentives are the most focused on
employment and income growth for low income individuals.

Nature of Incentives
Each of the five evaluation reports listed available incentives. These
lists tend to emphasize tax credits and may not be a comprehensive list of aid
available from the local zone administration agency (fable 5-4). Job training
and financial programs that are generally available to businesses in the state
would not be listed as incentives. Of the five states, only the Texas evaluation
mentions business assistance and financial programs as integral parts of the
overall zone program.
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Table 5-4. Type of Incentives
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General business assistance

The mix of incentives offered in enterprise zones shape the outcome of
the program, but in ways that are only tentatively understood (Wilder and
Rubin 1996) One of the unique aspects of the evaluation design used in N ew
Jersey is the business survey gathered data on the use of incentives by type of
business. Based on the survey, three out of every four enterprise zone firms
employ fewer than 50 people. Firms with over 500 employees represent 2.6%
of all zone firms. Seventy percent of all businesses in the study were in
business within a zone prior to 1980. Twenty-six percent started up since the
program was initiated in 1985 and only four percent relocated into the zone.
Small firms find the least benefit in enterprise zone incentives. Rubin
and Armstrong (1989) found a strong negative correlation between firm size
and the likelihood that the survey respondent reported the enterprise zone
tax benefits had no impact on "their decisions to locate in, or expand
operations in, the enterprise zone."

Firms moving into the zone from out of
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state are more likely to report that zone benefits have an impact on their
location decision. The small, marginal firms that enterprise zones were
originally designed to assist, make up the majority of businesses within the
zones, but program incentives apparently provide more important benefits to
larger firms.

Table 5-5. Impact of Tax Breaks on Firm Decisions by Number of Employees
in New Jersey
Size of Firm
Percent Reporting No Impact
Fewer than 10 employees
47%
10-19 employees
20%
20-49
22%
50-99
4%
100-499
6%
500+
0%
Source: Rubin and Armstrong (1989): 26
In the survey firms were asked to rate the importance of zone benefits

from 1, for the most important, to 6. Firm in all size classes rated exemption
from sales tax on personal property and on materials as the most important
zone benefits. The popularity of sales taxes stems not from their monetary
value, but from their universal availability. Sales tax benefits are available to
all kinds of firms within the zone and are not tied to hiring requirements.
Retail establishments, which account for 25% of all zone businesses in New
Jersey, are not eligible for corporate tax credits even if they hire targeted
workers.
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Table 5-6. Importance Ratings of Enterprise Zone Tax Benefits in New Jersey
Zone Tax Benefit
Mean Rating (l=most important)
Sales Tax Exemption on
-personal property
1.89
-materials
2.17
-services
2.59
Corporation Tax Credit
-$1,500
3.59
-$500
4.01
Unemployment Insurance Tax Rebate
4.44
Source: Rubin and Armstrong 1989: 29
Corporate Business Tax and Unemployment Insurance tax
benefits require firms to meet specific hiring criteria and I or
require extensive record keeping. Many firms noted in their
responses that they cannot hire the type of employees required
for Urban Enterprise Zone tax credit eligibility and still conduct a
profitable business. In fact, many respondent firms suggested
that a better trained labor force would improve business
conditions in the UEZs. Other firms have stated that the paperwork associated with the benefits is too time consuming relative
to the value of the benefit offered.
When asked to specify why they do not use the UEZ benefits, the
.
.
primary reasons given were:
41 %
- Employees not qualified
- Unaware of benefits
13%
8%
- Bureaucratic requirements
- Not a corporation
6%
(Rubin and Armstrong 1989: 29-30)
This evidence from New Jersey's experience leads to a few general
observations. Ironically while, New Jersey got the most marks for targeting
incentives through requirements in Table 5-2, the evaluation suggests that on
net, the incentives offered are not targeted in a way to maximize
opportunities for minorities or to maximize job growth. The connection
between zone incentives and hiring "disadvantaged" zone workers is
tenuous.

Existing urban education and job training is inadequate to bridge

the gap between employer expectations and the apparent skills of
disadvantaged applicants. From a minority equity standpoint, the most
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important incentives are those that help minority-owned businesses or create
better jobs for minority workers. Minority workers may benefit from
enterprise zones indirectly through the improved vitality of zone businesses,
but many firms do not hire "qualified" zone workers for new jobs. The kind
of enterprise zone incentives most typically offered do not assist start-up
firms as much as larger establishments. Incentives like sales tax relief are
geographically targeted through zone selection but are otherwise not
strategically aimed at aiding specific workers or firms with high potential for
creating jobs.

Summary of Conclusions Made by Evaluators
Two evaluations, Colorado, and Florida found a mismatch between
goals and programs as implemented. Colorado identified problems with
selection of territory for inclusion in zones. Florida found the mismatch
between incentives offered and the needs of zone firms. The lack of critical
data was a significant barrier to drawing conclusions about zone success. The
conclusions evaluators were able to make with available data limited the
discussion to things that were easiest to measure. Only New Jersey surveyed
firms to collect data beyond administratively collected data, government
statistics, and observations by zone administrators.
The five studies did draw some conclusions with relevance to helping
the poor. Colorado looked at evidence for job creation, information about
whether jobs were filled by zone residents or resulted in an increase in per
capita income, and changes in the statutory distress indicators: per capita
income, unemployment, population change. Colorado could find no
evidence of progress in these areas. The major contribution of the
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evaluation, in this regard, was suggestions of how to improve the program so
impacts can be assessed.

Table 5-7. Conclusions Made by the Five State Evaluations
Implementation Process
Program Impact
Colorado

The manner in which the program has been
implemented is inconsistent with statutory
goals. The huge extent of current zones, the
amendment of boundaries to include new areas
that do not meet selection criteria, and the
disproportionate use of investment tax credits
are the primary evidence for this conclusion.

Existing reporting mechanisms are inadequate
to assess program impact. The irregular and
discontinuous boundaries of the zones make
it impossible to use census data to evaluate
change in socio-economic indicators.

Florida

Low participation by businesses reveals a
poor fit between goals and some of the
incentives. The program does not address some
of the more critical needs of small businesses.

No definitive judgment of program success.
Areas continue to be econorrucally distressed.
Some zones have shown limited improvement,
and most have not deteriorated substantially.
Program had negligible impact on the hiring of
AFDC recipients or JTP A participants. The
program may have had an rm pact on the hiring
of zone residents, but credits were claimed for
less than 2% of the eligible work force.
The program's overalJ impact on
unemployment and other socioeconomic
conditions have been minimal. The Annual
Report overstates the benefits of the program.
Companies locating in enterprise zones are
not necessarily newly created or relocating
from outside Texas. The program is not
having a large impact on the most distressed
areas m the state.

Texas

The program's impact on the tax base of zones
has l:leen minimal.
The enterprise zone program had substantial
positive impact on New jersey's economy.
The benefits outweigh the costs.

New Jersey

Wisconsin

Business participation is less than expected.
Factors contributing to the low-level of
business participation include "limited
business awareness of the program, limited
availability of suitable development sites, and
the reluctance of some private corporations
disclose business plans as part of the
certification process" (Wisconsin 1993: 5).
Without a verification procedure for claimed
tax credits there is no way to assure that
businesses complied with their initial plans.
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No impact. It is unlikely that the program is
meeting its statutory gOals at the existing low
levels of participation.
It is too early to assess the long-term
effectiveness of improving the economic health
of the zones.

The Florida Office of the Auditor General (1993) concluded that the
program had a negligible impact on hiring AFDC recipients or JTP A
participants and a modest impact on hiring zone residents. Overall
socioeconomic conditions in the zone did not improve. The occupational
mix of zone residents stayed the same. No zones showed major
improvement in their economic environment in terms of median income,
incidence of poverty, and unemployment. Measurements by the Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau (1993) included the number of certified individuals
receiving jobs (1,018), the wages paid to those individuals, and some
observations about the duration of employment.
The Texas State Auditor (Alwin 1994) looked to see if the zones were
targeted toward the poorest areas and found they were not. The report
concluded that the Texas program did not target areas with the highest
unemployment as evidenced by the fact that jobs were certified in only 2 of
the 10 counties with the highest levels of unemployment. Certified actual job
creation by designated projects occurred in 21 counties. ln 7 of those counties,
the number of jobs created amounts to less than 0.1 percent of the labor force.
Four of the studies engaged the issue of whether their state zones were
effectively targeted toward the most distressed places of disadvantaged people,
and none of the four had a positive finding. The one evaluation finding an
overall positive impact left the issue of targeting benefits out of the picture
entirely. These reports leave several important issues completely off the
table: income inequality, workforce skills, and the wealth or minority status
of business owners. Most reports did not even inquire about firm size or the
importance of start-up businesses or businesses new to the enterprise zone.
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Lessons from the Five State Evaluations
The five state enterprise zone evaluations reviewed in this study
provide little direct evidence that enterprise zones are successful in
employing disadvantaged persons and no evidence that they alleviate
existing racial inequity. Doubts about the wisdom of enterprise zones as
enacted arise from the first level of evaluation, the logical link between the
goals and the tools of intervention. Much of this weakness stems from lack
of clarity about the goals of the program. There is a real mix between an
emphasis toward benefiting people and improving places. This study focuses
on a very narrow goal of enterprise zones, which has not been the primary
concern of other evaluators and authors. But, even when we go beyond the
goal of addressing minority inequity, existing evaluations come up short in
demonstrating benefits on a variety of levels. In the end, we have weak and
non-comprehensive evidence that any of the goals have been achieved. New
Jersey is the only one of the five studies in where evaluators felt satisfied that
they had found a positive impact of the program, and that was the only study
in which evaluators did not even raise questions about how well benefits
were targeted or who benefited. They even assumed values for key
indicators, like wages, that they should have measured.
Evaluations need to be clear about whether enterprise zones are a
general economic stimulus package aimed at aggregate net growth in the state
economy or whether they are aimed at improving the conditions in the
poorest areas or the poorest people. A program can be successful at the
distributional goal of improving the economic situation of the zones without
creating any net income growth in the state and vice versa. Estimates of
overall economic impact may help policy makers evaluate the returns on
public investment in the broadest sense, but they do not provide any
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information about whether the program is meeting the socioeconomic equity
objective.
Elaborate attempts to estimate economic impacts fall apart if they are
not based on real measures of program activity, and they become less
meaningful if they do not address program goals. The barriers to evaluation
include access to consistent data on the subjects of interest, uncertainty, and
the presence of confounding factors. This survey of enterprise zones
evaluations suggests several lessons for future evaluations.
The most common conclusion by evaluators is that they had
insufficient evidence to draw sound conclusions. The disappointing
evidence of program benefits does not prove that zones are an entirely
ineffective urban policy tool, but it does highlights some of the weaknesses in
program data collection and evaluation design. A good evaluation design
must spell out the expected outcomes of the program and assemble evidence
to determine whether or not the program resulted in the desired outcome.
The data problems faced by state program evaluators highlight the
importance of designing programs to allow evaluation. Documenting use of
zone incentives and associated investments needs to be part of program
administration. In addition, zones should be contiguous and correspond to
census geography enough that available distress statistics will allow
evaluators to measure change.
In the case of enterprise zones, we are trying to evaluate change in the
zone over time as a result of the program. Time series studies need
measurements at multiple points in time to show the overall trend before
and after the program began. With time series studies there is a very real
possibility that something other than the program may be causing observed
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changes. A convincing evaluation design would measure change over time
that is different from change in comparable areas.
A quasi-experimental design, must substitute for a controlled
experiment because zones are not selected randomly. We can select
comparison areas that share many characteristics with the zone to provide
supporting evidence as to whether the trends observed in the zone are a
result of the zone program or external circumstances. The multiple time
series design combining time series measurements and comparison groups is
ideal for enterprise zones because it provides some measure of control for
likely economic trends in absence of the program.
Overall, the plethora of targeting mechanisms demonstrates an intent
to target zones to economically disadvantaged populations and locations.
When state evaluators asked whether the program produced positive
economic benefits and for whom, they generally were unable to produce
positive evidence. Despite the rhetoric about enterprise zones, there is a lack
of thorough evaluation research and no compelling theoretical argument to
suggest that enterprise zones will accomplish equity goals. The divided focus
between targeting places and targeting people, makes less clear what outcome
is desired and how it should be measured. There is a poor fit between
enterprise zone programs and the goal of improving the economic status of
disadvantaged minorities.
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CHAPTER6
CONCLUSION

Enterprise zones, in general, are the wrong tool to fight poverty in
blighted urban neighborhoods. There is a poor fit between the structure of
enterprise zones and the goal of providing opportunities for economic
advancement to the urban poor. Nevertheless, no well-designed evaluation
research has been conducted to allow conclusions of much certainty on either
side of the issue. We are left with doubt about whether enterprise zones
improve the economic conditions in zones, little reason to believe they help
put the urban poor on the track of economic advancement, and no reason to
believe that zones are a step toward reducing racial inequality.

Recommendations for Future Evaluations
The evidence from evaluation studies reviewed in this report is patchy
and plagued with methodological problems. From the standpoint of this
study, existing evaluation research has not addressed all the essential
questions to understand who benefits from zones, but more glaringly, most
evaluations do not measure program impact. Enterprise zones do not, by
their nature, defy evaluation. Based on the strengths and oversights of earlier
studies I recommend future evaluations use a multiple time series
comparison evaluation design.
A multiple time series design measuring changes in particular
indicators over time in the zones and comparison areas is the most
promising quasi-experimental design to distinguish between program
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impacts and coincidental changes. When practical, measurement should be
made at multiple points in time to distinguish real trends from random or
cyclical fluctuation. Comparison areas are useful in program design to
distinguish the regional economic conditions facing the zone from the impact
of the zone program.
While no study will be able to encompass all important questions,
examination of minority participation in zone programs as new employees or
as entrepreneurs would add greatly to the understanding of the impact of
enterprise zones. We need more information about new jobs, including
wages, duration of employees in jobs, and whether the job offers
opportunities for advancement. Studies should also measure whether job
training is adequate to allow firms to hire disadvantaged workers. Collecting
data on these indicators would require use of administratively collected data,
surveys, and key informant interviews. The evaluation of comprehensive
economic development programs will always be problematic, but these
suggestions will help provide a clearer picture of program achievement,
particularly with regard to equity objectives.

Concluding Discussion
The policy debates on enterprise zones tend to underestimate and
obscure the costs of overcoming economic disadvantage. There are a lot of
political questions to be asked about enterprise zones, like who should benefit
from enterprise zones to justify the unequal tax treatment, and how
aggressively should benefits be targeted toward meeting the goal of minority
equity. This paper is premised on the claim that inequity along lines of race
or minority status is detrimental to the well-being and stability of the nation
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and that as a primary component of contemporary urban policy, enterprise
zones should seek to address existing disparities.
There is little reason to believe that enterprise zones programs that
simply emphasize investment and job creation will have any significant
impact on the concentration of poverty in central cities or on the long-term
economic status of minority populations. This study has found a lack of
attention to the question of who benefits. Many authors have posed this
question in a variety of ways, but the existing evaluation research holds only
generally negative, albeit inconclusive, evidence that enterprise zones benefit
urban minorities or the urban poor. This picture pieced together from
diverse sources is one of doubt about the potential effectiveness of state
enterprise zone programs. As tax incentive programs, enterprise zones are
not designed to combat the many facets of urban poverty including inequality,
segregation, and discrimination. Enterprise zones are a tool for increasing
local economic prosperity in a targeted area without a clear connection to any
economic model of urban poverty areas. The existence of profound
inequality speaks to the fact that even if enterprise zones were successful at
increasing investment and jobs in targeted areas, they would not necessarily
benefit people of all backgrounds or races equally. This could manifest itself
as the difference between improving the long-term earning potential of
disadvantaged workers and gentrifying a particular neighborhood.
According to the economic literature, ghetto development is a
multifaceted artifact of the economy. The literature reviewed in Chapters
Three and Four suggests that reversing economic decline in areas of
concentrated poverty will require intervention on many fronts including
investment in public services, education, and job networks.
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In conclusion, enterprise zones are not the correct tool to work toward
a solution to America's urban crisis. They have equivocal effects on the poor
and disadvantaged. They focus narrowly on jobs when geographical location
of jobs is not the only issue. The lack of conclusive evidence about benefits in
and of itself is not a compelling reason to abandon the urban enterprise zone
approach. But when we put all the fragments together, the story that emerges
is that enterprise zones, in their common form, are the wrong tool for
fighting concentrated urban poverty. The type of interventions incorporated
in state enterprise zone programs do not effectively intervene in the processes
of ghetto formation as we currently understand them. Targeting a small area
for revitalization is a valid way to maximize visible impact, but we need a
more comprehensive set of tools to deal with the larger issues of concentrated
urban poverty.
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